of independence, ethnic Estonians have constituted a comfortable majority of the national electorate during 1992 -2007. The local election law of 1993, however, stipulates that while citizens alone can run for office, all permanent residents have the right to vote, regardless of citizenship status. This has meant that the ethnic composition of the electorate has in some cases been wholly different at municipal level.
In this regard, the outright repudiation of the Soviet past displayed by local elites in Lihula stands in marked contrast to trends observable in the capital Tallinn, where Russian-speakers make up almost half the population, and Russian and pro-Russian parties, such as the Centre Party (Keskerakond), have been able to obtain a significant foothold in local politics. This contrast became evident not least in 1995, when the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II brought calls for the removal of the 'Bronze Soldier'. The city council, however, tried instead to imbue this monument with an alternative meaning: a Soviet-era plaque referring to the 'liberation' of Tallinn by the Red Army in 1944 was replaced by one that reads simply 'to the fallen of World War Two'. This step can be read as an effort to inculcate some kind of shared understanding of a highly contentious past within a deeply multi-ethnic setting. What trends, however, can one identify in the more homogeneously Russian periphery that is Narva?
'Estonia's new best friend'. The rediscovery of Estonia's Swedish past
The 'return' of the Swedish Lion monument to Narva, as one local newspaper described it (SommerKalda 2000), can be seen in many ways as the culmination of a process of Swedish re-engagement with the eastern Baltic 'Near Abroad' that began in 1990 with the establishment of a Swedish consulate in Tallinn. With considerable financial resources now being made available to support processes of economic and political transition in Estonia, Swedish cultural attach Hans Lepp began to explore how past cultural links might be utilised in the service of what he has termed 'soft diplomacy'.9
Historic ties with Scandinavia have assumed an important place within the discourse of the ruling ethnic Estonian political elite since the 1990s, where they have been used to support the notion of a 'Return to Europe'-or, more broadly, a 'Return to the Western World' following the end of Soviet occupation (Lauristin et al. 1997; Smith 2001 Smith , 2003a Smith , 2003b . Within this framework, the period 1561 -1710, when Sweden progressively extended its dominion over much of the territory of presentday Estonia and Latvia, is remembered as the 'Happy Swedish time', which is said to have brought about a considerable improvement in the lot of the Estonian peasantry, before serfdom was returned to its former rigour following entry to the Russian empire. Hans Lepp and his diplomatic colleagues were alive to the possibility of trading on this feeling of goodwill in order to make Sweden 'Estonia's best friend' in the Baltic region, with all that this implied in terms of political and economic influence.10
It quickly became apparent, however, that Swedish assistance was 'most needed' in Narva and its surrounding region of Ida-Virumaa. Quite apart from the socio-economic and environmental challenges posed by this largely Russian-populated border region, rising nationalism in neighbouring Russia raised the prospect that the local inhabitants might look eastwards towards Moscow rather than westwards towards Tallinn, with drastic implications for regional stability and security.11 In this specific context history had particular potential as a resource, given the important place of the Battle of Narva of 1700 within the Swedish historical imagination. Although the opening salvo in a disastrous war that saw the Baltic provinces ceded to Russia,12 the first Battle of Narva was nevertheless a remarkable victory by the troops of King Charles XII (often referred to as the 'Lion of the North') against the numerically superior forces of Peter the Great. In this respect, Eldar Efendiev, who as Mayor of Narva planned the November 2000 commemoration of the battle, claimed in an interview with the authors that 'Swedes know three dates-the birthday of Gustav Vasa; the birthday of the present King; and the date of the Battle of Narva'.13 The significance of the latter event had been seen already in the inter-war period with the installation of a Lion monument on the battlefield site in 1936.14 Already prior to his appointment as cultural attach in 1990, Hans Lepp-then Curator of the art collections at the Swedish Royal Palace in Stockholm-suggested to Efendiev (at that time Head of the Narva Museum) that the restoration of the Lion monument might help to foster closer ties between Narva and Sweden in the present. Lepp subsequently pursued the idea of restoring the Lion with Narva city council in his roles as Swedish cultural attach to Estonia and member of the Swedish Institute. Not surprisingly, however, planning the commemoration of a decisive Swedish victory over Russia was a potentially fraught endeavour in a town where Russian-speakers now made up 96% of the population.
Narva: Eastern, Western or in-between?
The more essentialising geopolitical discourses of the post-Cold War era would see Narva as sitting on the westward side of the border that divides Western Christianity from Eastern Orthodoxy. Those who discern a Huntingdonian civilisational fault line between Estonia and Russia could point by way of evidence to the presence of two great fortresses-one German, one Russian-on the respective banks of the Narova River that separates Narva from its neighbouring settlement of Ivangorod and which today marks the state border with the Russian Federation. Not unnaturally, however, the city's past is rather more complex. As noted on the current website of the city government, Narva has not merely served as a defensive outpost and site of struggle between competing regional powers, but has also constituted a locus for trade and interaction between West and East, not least during the period when the city belonged to the Hanseatic League.15 From its foundation in the twelfth century to 1558, Narva did indeed constitute the easternmost point of the province of Estland, which was ruled first by the Danes and later by the German Livonian Order. Neighbouring Ivangorod takes its name from Tsar Ivan III, who ordered the construction of a fortress on the western border of his realm following Muscovy's annexation of Novgorod in the late fifteenth century. Muscovy subsequently conquered Narva during the mid-sixteenth century Livonian wars, controlling the city from 1558 to 1581. The city then came under Swedish rule for 120 years following the Livonian Wars, a period which is described on the webpage of today's city government as Narva's 'Golden Age'.16
For nearly three and a half centuries, Narva and Ivangorod functioned in effect as a single composite settlement, first under Swedish rule and then later during the tsarist period, when Narva came under the joint jurisdiction of the Estland and Saint Petersburg Gubernii of the Russian Empire.
The conjoined status of the two towns persisted after 1917, when the inhabitants of the Narva district voted in a July referendum to join the province of Estland created following the February Revolution.17 After a brief spell of Bolshevik control during late 1918 to early 1919, when Narva functioned as the seat of the abortive 'Estonian Workers' Commune', both towns were incorporated into the Estonian Republic under the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Tartu. It was only after the Soviet occupation in 1945 that the border was redrawn so as to place Ivangorod in the territory of the Russian Republic of the USSR. Although this division was little more than an administrative formality within a Soviet context, the frontier revision set the scene for the establishment of a fully functioning state border between the two towns after 1992.
The Narva that emerged from the Soviet period is almost completely unrecognisable from the one that existed prior to World War Two. Previously characterised as the 'baroque jewel' of Northern Europe, the city was quite literally reduced to rubble in 1944 during fierce fighting between German and Soviet forces in eastern Estonia. While at least some historic buildings-notably the castle and the town hall-were restored, the ruins were for the most part demolished and the city entirely remodelled on the Soviet plan. As was the case with K nigsberg (Kaliningrad), Narva 'was inhabited by both different inhabitants and a different ideology' after 1945 (Sezneva 2002, p. 48). The previous residents, having been evacuated by the occupying Nazi regime, were not allowed to return by its Soviet successor, and were replaced by workers from neighbouring Russia, who oversaw a process of Soviet-style industrialisation in the region. Today, Estonians make up less than 5% of the town's inhabitants.
As part of Narva's transformation into a 'Soviet place', new monuments were erected to remarkably, its former leaders were allowed to stand in new elections, and were returned to power in October 1991, albeit on a turnout of only 30%. As ethnic tensions mounted in Estonia between 1991 and 1993, and Narva's economy went into freefall, local leaders again set themselves in opposition to central government policies that were designed to engineer a decisive political and economic break with the Soviet past. The last stand of the Soviet-era leadership came in the summer of 1993: with fresh local elections scheduled for the autumn, the city government organised an unofficial referendum on local autonomy, in which it gained a 97% majority in favour on an officially proclaimed 55% turnout of local voters. With the national government standing firm and refusing to acknowledge the legality of the vote, and no support forthcoming from neighbouring Russia, a growing section of the local political elite appeared to accept that intransigent opposition to the new state order was blocking any prospect of achieving much needed economic renewal. These circles now called upon the existing leadership to give up power peacefully, which it did in October 1993 (Smith 2002b).
At the time, the referendum of July 1993 was widely regarded as secessionist in intent.
Available evidence, however, would seem to suggest that redrawing physical borders was not on the agenda: the aim was rather to tip the overall political balance within Estonia in favour of the Russianspeaking part of the population and, in this way, to bring Estonia as a whole more firmly within the ambit of Russia and the CIS. In this way, the leadership hoped both to retain power and to restore Ironically, one current member of the city government hinted that the statue has proved to be quite an attraction for the many foreign tourists who make a brief stop in Narva before crossing the Estonian -Russian border en route from Tallinn to St. Petersburg.22
In a recent article on the formerly closed and largely Russian-speaking port city of Paldiski, previously home to a Soviet submarine base, Tiina Peil (2005) asserts that the Soviet heritage of ugly grey buildings has nothing to offer in terms of promoting tourism and economic development. This claim requires some qualification in the case of Narva's neighbouring town of Sillam e, which was built in a highly distinctive style during the 1950s and is today beginning to market itself as a unique museum of Stalinist baroque architecture. As Peil rightly asserts, however, the socio-political changes since 1991 have impelled local Russians to connect to an ever greater degree with the pre-Soviet past as they strive to renegotiate their identities within the context of independent Estonia. Since most of the urban Russian population lack any obvious affinity to the era of inter-war independence, this quest for historical roots has in many cases led back to the more distant tsarist era.
The Narva city government readily acknowledged and recognised the importance of Russian history and culture to Narva's inhabitants during the decade or so after 1993. Once again, however, it sought to interpret and present this past in a manner broadly compatible with dominant national-level discourses on national identity. Following the removal of the Lenin monument in 1993, some local residents argued that a statue of Peter the Great should now be erected in its place on the main town square, which was named after the Russian Tsar (Solodov 2000). Advocates of this move could point to an historical precedent, in that an obelisk commemorating the anniversary of Peter's birth was erected in Narva's town hall square during the late tsarist period, only to be removed in 1922 following the attainment of Estonian independence. Any suggestion of restoring a Peter monument has, however, been deeply controversial given that the Tsar-whom Estonians in any case regard as a foreign conqueror-enjoys a privileged place within the current nation-building project of the Russian Federation. Eldar Efendiev, who served as mayor from 1999 to 2000, insisted that while he was in favour of restoring certain buildings and objects connected with Peter, he was opposed to the idea of a new statue. The option favoured by the city council during the late 1990s was to emphasise Narva's rather more tenuous links to one of the central figures of Russian culture-the poet Aleksandr
Pushkin. There is in fact little that connects Pushkin to Narva aside from the fact that one of the city's main thoroughfares still carries his name. A bust of the poet was nevertheless mounted there in 1999, as part of a festival of Russian culture in the town.23
The 'return' of the Swedish Lion Civil War battles that are regularly held in England. Expressing a code common to re-enactment groups elsewhere, members of the Preobrazhenskii Group were most emphatic that their activity had nothing to do with politics-it was simply motivated by the amateur historian's desire to recreate the past as faithfully as possible.40
Conclusion
At the time of writing, the space in Narva once occupied by the Lenin monument remained empty, a symbol perhaps of the still unfilled identity void bequeathed to the city by the collapse of the USSR.41
It would seem that for many of Narva's residents, there are in fact more immediate concerns than 'the politics of memory'. However, in so far as local residents do attach importance to their past, recent events appear to confirm Peil's assertion that Estonia's Russians are looking to the heritage of tsarist Russian rule in the Baltic provinces but also to the specific history of their city as they seek to renegotiate their identities within the framework of an independent state (Peil 2005). In this context, the Swedish Lion which appeared in November 2000 seems to have been regarded either with indifference or as a legitimate symbol of Narva's history, rather than an unwelcome incursion by some alien 'Other'. The Soviet identity project did indeed nurture local patriotism alongside identification with the Soviet state and 'Soviet people'; in her recent work on Kaliningrad, Olga Sezneva (2002) underscores the complexity of identity formation in the city, noting how official and popular interpretations of the city's identity did not always coincide during the Soviet period, and local people developed their own interpretation drawing on the Western heritage of the area. A similar phenomenon would seem to be apparent to some degree in post-Soviet Narva, where Efendiev described the remaining elements of the city's old town as an 'integral part of the mentality of any Narvitian'.42
In this respect, it would appear that many local people have been able to subscribe to the notion of the Swedish past as a 'Golden Age', especially when this is set against the background of growing engagement with Sweden in the present. And yet, for all of the undoubted sensitivity and inclusivity of the November 2000 commemoration, the 'official' version of the past embodied in these events did not adequately accommodate the specifically Russian dimension of the Great Northern War, or put another way, did not map fully onto 'social memory' within the city. As such, it elicited calls from within civil society for further heritage events based around the Russian victory of 1704.
The challenge in the current political climate is of course how to ensure that such commemorations are seen as cultural in nature rather than as an expression of nationalist politics.
Seen from the standpoint of 'democratising history', the Narva battles staged since 2004 seem to have represented a successful negotiation of the past, one that is consonant with the declared goal of 'multicultural integration' within the framework of an independent Estonia. Like the Swedish days before them, the spectacles of 2004 -06 have sought to frame the Great Northern War as part of a 'shared past' capable of uniting Russians, Estonians and Swedes. Perhaps more pertinently, they would lead one to the conclusion that, unlike the events of 1940s, the Great Northern War is the past rather than-as Michael Ignatieff puts it-the 'past in the present'.43 Here it is notable that the reenactors involved in organising these events largely echoed Efendiev's views regarding proposals for a Peter the Great monument. For them, restoring 'authentic' places connected with the Russian Tsar was far more important than putting up a monument in a place where one had not stood before. Such proposals, observed one of the group, only arise when someone in authority sees a 'political need' for them.44
The preceding remark, however, brings to mind George Sch pflin's point about the difficulty of 'creating rules beyond the political contest' (Sch pflin 2002, p. 135). This was exemplified several months after the fieldwork for this article was conducted, when Narva city council adopted a resolution authorising its Chairman, Mikhail Stalnukhin of the Centre Party fraction, to begin negotiations with Russian funding bodies on the erection of a life-sized statue of Peter the Great in the city-not on the main square, but on one of the surviving bastions of the city walls of old Narva.
Hardly surprisingly, the council ruling elicited a heated discussion, both locally and nationally.
Stalnukhin for his part said he found it incredible that anyone should even ask whether it was necessary to put up a monument to Peter in the town, noting that 'in Narva there is a monument to the Swedish King, the Swedish Lion. Why should one not also put up a monument to Peter I, who did battle with Charles XII?'45 Such a move was apparently also justified on the grounds that it would attract a considerable number of tourists and thus additional revenue to the town. Stalnukhin added that none of the key historical figures connected to Narva was entirely controversial: since inter-war Estonian President Konstantin P ts had been the first honorary citizen of Narva, one could argue that he too should have his own monument. This suggestion, however, would also elicit contrasting reactions within the town.46 Yet, in an echo of the line hitherto adopted by the city government, Narva Town Secretary Ants Liimets argued that Peter's historical importance to Narva was overshadowed by the questionable reputation of conqueror which he commands within Estonia as a whole. In this respect, Liimets remarked that while Ghengis Khan and Napoleon were undoubtedly notable figures in the history of Russia, it seemed highly unlikely that any Russian city would erect a monument in their honour. 47 Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip made this point in even more forceful terms, observing that neither Narva nor Estonia as a whole had any reason to be thankful to Peter. Commenting on the proposal, Ansip associated the Russian invasion of the Baltic provinces primarily with the destruction of his home city of Tartu, but also noted that Peter's forces killed or deported a significant proportion of Narva's population after the city fell in 1704.48 Most tellingly, however, Ansip referred to the removal of Peter the Great monuments from inter-war Estonia, and argued that re-establishing these would be to 'spit in the face' of Estonia's inter-war leaders. Putting up monuments to conquerors, he insisted, showed disregard for national consciousness: while upholding such consciousness should not imply isolation, it did entail the need to 'keep order in one's own backyard'. In recent times, Estonia had allowed the infiltration of signs and symbols absolutely alien to its culture: 'we have been ultratolerant during this time, but tell me: what should foreigners admire when they come here? That which is already familiar to them from their homeland? '49 In this respect, Ansip added, a Peter the Great statue at Kadriorg in Tallinn (the eighteenthcentury palace that the Tsar had built for his wife and which is today the official residence of the President of Estonia) might attract thousands of tourists and millions of kroons in revenue, but one cannot simply reduce everything to money and especially not symbols, which have a far more Here one thinks especially of Michael Billig's work on nationalism, which directs us to focus not on days of national celebration, but rather on the more mundane or 'banal' symbols and social forms which sustain and reproduce national identity on a day-to-day basis. In this regard 'the metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being constantly waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building' (Billig 1995, p. 7).
It is revealing in this connection that Hans Lepp's first visit to Narva as Swedish cultural attach in 
